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Abstract
This paper investigates the presence of political budget cycles (PBCs) in the Eu-
ropean Union using a data set encompassing all 27 current member states over the
period 1997-2008, and analyzes what may explain their variability across countries
and over time. Conditioning on partisan considerations and several socio-economic
variables, we find evidence in favor of a systematic electoral cycle in fiscal policy
(i.e. spending and budget deficits are raised in election years). Furthermore, we
find that PBCs are much larger in the Eurozone countries than in the countries
that have not yet adopted the euro. Finally, we discuss an interesting area for fu-
ture research, namely, fiscal policy manipulations are influenced by the information
available to the market before elections. Specifically, we show that the size of PBCs
is inversely proportional to the relative weight voters assign to non-economic issues
prior to an election and positively correlated with the uncertainty over the electoral
outcome. Once we account for these two features, the aforementioned differences
between the Eurozone and the non-Eurozone countries seem to disappear.
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1
21 Introduction
The term “political budget cycle” (PBC) is used to describe a cyclical fluctuation in
fiscal policies induced by the timing of elections. The direct cause of a PBC lies in gov-
ernment’s opportunistic behaviour: incumbent politicians, regardless of their ideology,
try to use expansionary fiscal policies before elections to please the voters, maximize
their popularity and increase their reelection chances.
Several empirical studies, both at single-country and multi-country level1, find evi-
dence in favor of such election-driven fiscal policy manipulations. However, the econo-
metric techniques applied and the estimated size and composition (expenditures versus
spending) of electoral effects vary across these studies. Moreover, the fact that they use
data from different types of countries renders it difficult to conclude whether PBCs are a
universal phenomenon. Taking these issues into account, the recent empirical literature
has turned its attention to answer the question of where PBCs exist and what explains
their cross-sectional variation. For instance, Shi & Svensson (2002, 2006) show that the
magnitude of PBCs is higher in developing countries than in developed countries for a
large panel data set of 85 countries over the period 1975-1995, and that this difference
is driven by two institutional features, namely government’s rents from remaining in
power and voters’ access to free media. Likewise, Gonzalez (2002), who examine the
relationship between the level of democracy (the cost of removing a policymaker from
office) and the magnitude of PBCs in a sample of 43 countries over the period 1950-1997,
shows that PBCs are larger in countries with an intermediate level of democracy2. On
the other hand, Persson & Tabellini (2002), using a dataset of 60 democracies for the
period 1960-1998, present evidence that the composition of PBCs is affected by electoral
rules (majoritarian versus proportional) and the form of government (presidential versus
parliamentary)3. Brender & Drazen (2005) suggest that the results of these studies are
driven by the first few elections in countries that are “new democracies”, where fiscal
manipulation may work because of lack of experience with electoral politics or lack of
information that is available in established democracies and used by experienced voters.
The presence of PBCs in the European Union (EU) has also received a considerable
research attention over the last 10 years and remains an interesting topic for study. On
one hand the fiscal policy of the EU member countries is restricted by the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP) but on the other hand it is the only remaining instrument,
at least for the Eurozone countries, to influence voters’ perceptions before elections (as
monetary policy is not an option in the context of the monetary union) and, hence,
the existence of PBCs in the EU is theoretically questionable. The empirical evidence
1For individual country studies, see Alesina (1988); Alesina & Roubini (1992); Alesina et al. (1997)
for the United States over the period 1946-1994, Krueger & Turan (1993) for Turkey over the period
1950-1980, Gonzalez (2002) for Mexico over the period 1958-1997, and Efthyvoulou (2008) for Cyprus
over the period 1978-2006. For multi-country studies, see Ames (1987); Kraemer (1997); Rojas-Suarez
et al. (1998) for different samples of Latin American countries, Alesina et al. (1997); Franzese (2000);
Tujula & Wolswijk (2004) for different samples of OECD countries, Schuknecht (1996) for a panel of 35
developing countries over the period 1970-1992 and Block (2002) for a cross-section of 44 Sub-Saharan
African countries. See also Alesina et al. (1997); Drazen (2000); Franzese (2002); Shi & Svensson (2004)
for extensive reviews of the empirical literature.
2Also Alt & Lassen (2003) and Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya (2004) find that greater fiscal transparency
(the probability that voters learn the incumbent’s characteristics costlessly) is associated with smaller
PBCs.
3More precisely, they show that (i) preelection tax cuts are present in all democracies while postelec-
tion fiscal adjustments (spending cuts, tax hikes and rises in surplus) are only present in presidential
democracies and (ii) majoritarian electoral rules are associated with preelectoral spending cuts while
proportional electoral rules are associated with expansions of welfare spending both before and after
elections.
3is also contradictory. After a thorough empirical study covering the years 1970-1998,
Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) fail to find electoral cycle regularities in fiscal instruments
in 14 EU member states. On the other hand, Buti & van den Noord (2003), von Hagen
(2003) and Mink & de Haan (2005), who focus on the fiscal behaviour in more recent
years (1998-2004), show that the discipline requirements of the SGP are insufficient to
curb the temptation to run politically-motivated fiscal policies before elections. This
result is not confirmed by Warin & Donahue (2006) who argue that the implementation
of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP prevented the occurence of a PBC during the
years 1993-20054. Although these studies have provided some important insights, the
results obtained are not representative of the enlarged EU of 27 members and the current
developments in the European politico-economic environment. In particular, none of
the datasets contains the 12 “newest” member states and, thus, little is known about
the cross-sectional variation in the size and composition of PBCs (e.g. between the
established and new democracies or between the Eurozone countries and the ones that
have not yet adopted the euro). Furthermore, the studies cited above treat the timing
of elections as exogenous (i.e. elections occur at fixed time intervals), use a univariate
model or univariate detrending procedures (von Hagen, 2003; Buti & van den Noord,
2003; Andrikopoulos et al., 2004) or focus on the detection of electoral effects in the
overall budget deficits (von Hagen, 2003; Mink & de Haan, 2005; Warin & Donahue,
2006). To address all these issues, this paper assembles a panel data set consisting of all
27 current EU (to be referred to as EU-27) member countries over the period 1997-2008
and examines the presence of PBCs in several fiscal policy variables using the system
GMM estimation technique. Moreover, it investigates how PBCs vary across the EU
member states and whether they are influenced by the endogeneity of election timing,
partisan considerations and politico-institutional conditions that have been shown to
correlate with measures of fiscal policy.
Another serious limitation of the existing literature on PBCs is the inability to
take all political repercussions into account and formulate a more realistic approach to
government’s reaction function around elections. PBC models rely on the assumption
that the electorate evaluates the government solely on the basis of its competency to
deal with economic matters and, as a result, a government can secure re-election by
signaling this competency through specific fiscal policy decisions. In practice, though,
economic matters are not always on top of the public’s political agenda and voters’
evaluation of government performance depends also on non-economic matters for which
the government is responsible (i.e. fight of terrorism and crime, dealing with certain
socio-political problems, management of foreign affairs, etc). Since issue importance is
a significant source of heterogeneity in political decision-making (Rivers, 1988; Brody,
1991), it is reasonable to assume that politicians’ incentives to manipulate the economy
in general, and fiscal policy in particular, is influenced by “non-economic voting”, that
is, the relative impact that non-economic issues have on vote choice. Furthermore,
a correct specification of the government’s reaction function around elections should
also take into account the uncertainty over the electoral outcome, as captured by the
information available to the market prior to an election. As Boix & Strokes (2007)
point out, where competitiveness5 is intense, politicians make greater efforts to mobilize
4However, the evidence of Warin & Donahue (2006) is not very convincing. For instance, they
search for electoral effects through partisan interaction terms, i.e. the votes for all political parties
in the previous election, which do not necessarily capture intenal political pressures in the subsequent
preelectoral period and might also be affected by the absence of partisan cycles.
5Competitiveness is often measured as the ex-ante closeness of two candidates in the electoral race,
i.e. the expected margin of victory.
4support and voters pay more attention to politics. Put differently, when governments
are afraid of losing an election, they are more induced to influence the economy in order
to increase their popularity, and on the contrary, when they are confident of winning
the election (or equivalently, almost certain of losing the election, e.g. because of a
political scandal), they allow themselves to pursue ideologically-oriented policies, which
need not always be popular with the electorate (see also Frey & Schneider, 1978). These
observations imply (i) that PBCs may vary across countries and over time, even after
controlling for all the aforementioned aspects associated with the process of fiscal policy
formation, and (ii) that the magnitude of PBCs is inversely proportional to the relative
weight voters assign to non-economic issues prior to an election and positively correlated
with the uncertainty over the electoral outcome. Therefore, the second objective of this
paper is to construct proxies for these two factors using public opinion reports and
preelectoral polls and investigate whether such indicators can also explain a part of the
difference in the size of PBCs across the EU-27 member states.
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, incumbent
governments across the EU tend to manipulate fiscal policy in order to maximize their
chances of being reelected. In particular, fiscal deficit increases by 1% of GDP in election
years through increases in components and subcomponents of government expenditure
of similar magnitude. These fiscal policy manipulations do not seem to be the outcome
of endogenously determined election timing nor to be mitigated in the period following
the EU enlargement of 2004. Second, the relative importance of non-economic issues
prior to elections and the uncertainty over the electoral outcome can explain, to a large
extent, the variability in the size of PBCs across and within the EU countries. And
third, differences in PBCs across subsamples of countries (i.e. the Eurozone and the
non-Eurozone coutnries) can disappear once we combine the data on fiscal policy with
the information available to the market before the elections.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.1 provides a brief theoretical overview of
the PBCs literature. Section 2 describes the data and the relevant sources. Section
3 outlines the empirical model specification and presents the fiscal policy instruments,
the control variables and the econometric methodology used for our analysis. Section 4
introduces the concepts of non-economic voting and competitiveness into the study of
PBCs, discusses the data and variables used to proxy for these two features and tests
empirically whether these can actually explain the variability in the size and composition
of PBCs across the EU countries. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Theoretical Overview
A large theoretical literature on political business cycles goes back to Nordhaus (1975)
and Lindbeck (1976). Opportunistic policymakers take advantage of the exploitable
Phillips curve and choose policies to please the voters and remain in office. That is,
they artificially stimulate the economy immediately before each election and eliminate
the resulting inflation with a postelectoral recession. The first paper to study PBCs6 is
by Rogoff & Sibert (1988), who propose a model of adverse selection that emphasizes
the idea of competency (ability to handle the economy) coupled with asymmetric in-
formation. More precisely, this model assumes that each politician has a competence7
type (high or low), which is considered to be private information: only the politician
6That is, to extend Nordhadus-Lindbeck theory to rational voters, while explaining the existence
of political cycles as sufficiently complicated budgetary process, which can, at least temporarily, fool
voters.
7In this model, competence is interpreted as the ability to limit waste in the budget process, so that
the required amount of spending can be financed with a smaller amount of total revenues.
5knows his own competency. Voters, who want to elect the political candidate (either the
incumbent or the challenger) who maximizes their expected utility, can assess the incum-
bent’s type only by observing fiscal policy outcomes. Before the election, the high-type
incumbent attempts to signal his competence by engaging in expansionary fiscal policy,
which is less “costly” to him than it is for the low-type. This behavior leads to a PBC
when the more competent politician is in office, that resembles, although with impor-
tant differences, the Nordhaus-Lindbeck political business cycle. Rogoff (1990) presents
a related model that empasizes the composition of government spending. Specifically,
he argues that the more competent policymaker engineers a PBC that shifts government
outlays to favor transfers and more visible programs instead of investment projects and
possibly tax cuts. As pointed out by Shi & Svensson (2004), some of the implications of
these models (also referred to as “adverse-selection PBCs models”) seem to be at odds
with empirical evidence. For example, since only the more competent politician distorts
the economy prior to an election, only he can be reelected, which, in turn, implies that
additional information is needed (on the incumbent’s type) to test the predictions of
PBCs.
These drawbacks do not apply to the new generation of PBCs proposed by Persson
& Tabellini (2000) and Shi & Svensson (2006) (also referred to as “moral-hazard PBCs
models”). The key assumptions of these models are that (i) neither the electorate
nor the politician can observe the latter’s competence contemporaneously and (ii) the
policymaker can exert a hidden effort, that is, use a policy instrument unobservable
to the public (or only observable with a delay), which is a substitute for competence.
For example, if competence measures how well the politician can convert revenues into
public goods, then the hidden effort can be interpreted as the government’s short-term
excess borrowing. Elections take place after the incumbent politician’s hidden effort
and competence have jointly determined the observable fiscal policy outcome. In the
equilibrium of this game, there is an excessive effort (e.g. more borrowing), and as a
result, an increase in the budget deficit prior to an election. Note that, in contrast
to adverse selection models, all incumbent politicians can generate PBCs regardless of
their competence level, and hence, one can test the relevant empirical implications for
all governments and for all countries that have elections.
2 Data
We consider annual time series data for all EU-27 member states over the period 1997-
20088. The resulting panel includes a number of economic, socio-economic and political
variables. Government fiscal policy data and statistics regarding economic outcomes
are obtained from the Statistical Annex to European Economy, published in Spring
2005 and in Spring 2009. Data on demographic variables are extracted from the on-
line version of US Census Bureau International Data Base (IDB). Information on each
country’s election dates, forms of government, electoral rules, government fragmenta-
tion and government position on a left-right scale are retrieved from the Database of
Political Institutions of the World Bank (Beck et al., 2001) and complemented, where
needed, by the online version of the Europa Yearbook, Adam Carr’s Election Archive9
and the author’s personal research. The “proxy” for the relative importance of eco-
nomic and non-economic issues before elections is constructed from reports of public
8A larger time period is not available due to the lack of statistical data concerning various categories
of the variables employed in the countries of the sample.
9An online comprehensive archive of federal elections statistics since 1901, and state and territory
statistics since 1990.
6opinion as provided by the Eurobarometer10. Finally, poll data on voting intention and
support ratings for political parties (or political candidates) are obtained from the An-
gus Reid Global Monitor11 and the official websites of national market research centers
and polling organizations. More details on variable definitions and data sources can be
found in Table A.3.3 on page 33.
3 Empirical Model Specification
In order to estimate the relationship between elections and government fiscal policies,
we employ an empirical specification that builds on the work of Shi & Svensson (2002,
2006) and Persson & Tabellini (2002) and takes the following form12:
Yit =
2∑
j=1
αjYit−j + βXit + γGROWTHit + δELEit + µi + εit (M.1)
where Yit is a fiscal policy instrument in country i and year t, Xit is a vector of control
variables, GROWTHit is the GDP growth rate, ELEit is an electoral dummy variable,
µi are unobserved country-specific effects and εit is an i.i.d. error term. We focus on
seven fiscal policy instruments, all scaled to GDP and expressed as percentages, namely
net lending (NLit), total expenditure and revenue (TEXPit, TREVit), current expen-
diture and revenue (CEXPit, CREVit), final consumption expenditure (FCEit) and
total taxes (TAXit). Our control variables include the level of development (LnGDPit),
measured by the logarithm of real GDP per capital, the trade shock (TRADESKit),
measured by the deviation of trade share13 from its trend value (derived using the
Hodrick-Prescot filter with λ = 100), two demographic variables representing the per-
centage of population aged 15-64 and 65+ (PROP1564it and PROP65it), the frac-
tionalisation of government (FRACit), measured by the probability that two deputies
picked at random among the government parties will be of different parties14 and finally
the positioning of the government on a left-right scale (EXECRLCit), measured by
a dummy variable that equals -1 for left governments, 0 for centrist governments and
+1 for right governments15. These variables have been shown to correlated with fiscal
policy outcomes in previous studies, such as Cameron (1978), Rodrick (1998), Persson
10A series of surveys regularly performed on behalf of the European Commission that measure the
evolution of public opinion on key issues in all EU member states.
11One of the world’s largest online public opinion database - includes surveys from all countries on a
wide range of topics.
12As Persson & Tabellini (2002) point out, when we want to find evidence of electoral cycles, it is
important to allow for reasonably rich dynamics in the policy variables. Because the fiscal instruments
display a great deal of inertia, we need to include lagged dependent variables on the right hand side.
And, because fiscal instruments tend to be highly cyclical, we also need to include a measure of cyclical
fluctuations.
13Trade share is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services over GDP (TRADEit). Notice
that the inclusion of TRADEit, instead of TRADESKit, in the model specification poses a multi-
collinearity threat due to high collinearity between the former variable and GROWTHit.
14This probability is calculated using a concentration measure normalized to lie between 0 and 1, i.e.
1−∑Nn=1 S2n, where Sn is the seat share of government party n in the legislature, and N is the number
of government parties.
15To identify government orientation, we consider the chief executive’s party name and use the follow-
ing rules: (i) right: for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing, (ii)
left: for parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social-democratic, or left-wing and (iii) center:
for parties that are defined as centrist or when party position can be best described as centrist (e.g.
party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). The variable EXECRLCi,t
takes also the value zero when the chief executive appears to be independent.
7& Tabellini (1999), Perotti & Kontopoulos (2002), Hibbs (1977) and Alesina (1987).
Moreover, we control for the GDP growth rate to reflect fluctuations in fiscal policy
induced by the domestic business cycle. In order to ensure that this model specification
is the most appropriate one, we carry out several tests of statistical significance (i.e.
t-tests and F-tests). The coefficient estimates on TRADESKit and FRACit appear to
have no robust significant relationship with the government fiscal policy instruments
and be uncorrelated with the timing of elections. Since including them reduces the
sample size, we leave them out of the model specification16.
The electoral dummy variable ELEit codes the year the executive is elected. In other
words, it equals 1 in the years of legislative elections in parliamentary countries and in
the years of presidential elections in presidential countries17 and 0 in all other years. A
potential econometric problem that arises here is that treating all executive elections as
predetermined may bias our estimates of electoral cycles. Persson & Tabellini (2002)
point out that incumbent governments may strategically choose the timing of elections
conditional on fiscal policy outcomes18 and call early elections when the economy is
doing well - causing endogeneity bias from reverse causality19. On the other hand,
when the election date is known well in advance, incumbent governments have sufficient
time and far greater opportunity to manipulate fiscal policy in order to get reelected,
than when there are “snap” elections, with a short lag between elections being called and
being held (see Brender & Drazen, 2005). Although mitigated through the inclusion
of GDP growth in the empirical model, the first problem is addressed by looking at
two alternative election indicators that identify separately the elections whose timing
is predetermined20 and the elections whose timing is not predetermined. That is, we
replace the variable ELEi,t in equation (1) with the variables ELEPit and ELENPit21
respectively. To cope with the second problem, we consider a weighted electoral variable
that assigns a smaller weight to non-predetermined elections, denoted by WELEit and
computed as ELEPit + wELENPit, where 0 < w < 1 (to be specified later).
Since we are also interested in studying cross country variations in PBCs, we par-
tition the sample into subsamples of (i) plurality and non-plurality countries (ii) pres-
idential and parliamentary countries (iii) established and new democracies and (iv)
Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries, and estimate the following version of regression
16In addition, treating TRADESKit as an endogenous variable in the estimation of the model by the
system GMM procedure generates a great many instruments (see Appendix A.2).
17Notice that in parliamentary democracies, elections of the legislative and the executive coincide,
while in presidential democracies, the executive is separately elected and legislative elections may take
place in between years of presidential elections. However, as Persson & Tabellini (2002) show, such
“mid-term” legislative elections are not significant determinants of fiscal policy in presidential regimes.
18Especially in parliamentary democracies where elections are not typically held on a fixed schedule
with, say, four or five years in between elections.
19Another potential problem is that both timing of elections and fiscal policies may be affected by a
number of unobserved variables, such as crises or social unrest, which are not included in our regression
- causing an omitted variable bias (see Shi & Svensson, 2002, 2006). We deal with this problem in
Section 5 by controlling for the information available to the market prior to elections.
20To do so, we follow an approach similar to the one of Shi & Svensson (2002, 2006) and classify an
election to be predetermined if either (i) the election occurs in the last year of a constitutional fixed
term for the legislature; or (ii) the election is announced at least a year in advance. Among the 76
elections in the sample, 67 are classified as predetermined.
21ELEPit equals 1 in country i and year t if an election that is predetermined takes place, 0 otherwise;
while ELENPit equals 1 in country i and year t if an election that is not predetermined takes place, 0
otherwise.
8model (M.1):
Yit =
2∑
j=1
αjYit−j + βXit + γGROWTHit+
1∑
k=0
(
Dkγk[GROWTHkt −GROWTH(1−k)t] + [Dkδk + (1−Dk)δ1−k]ELEit
)
+
µi + εit (M.2)
where Dk = k ∈ {0, 1} is one of the four indicator (dummy) variables PLURk, PRESk,
DEMk and EUROk. PLUR1 refers to the EU-27 member states with a plurality
rule22 in legislative (lower house) elections (includes both strictly plurality and mixed
plurality-proportional electoral systems) whileMAJ0 to the EU-27 member states with
strictly proportional electoral systems23. PRES1 refers to the EU-27 member states
where the executive is not accountable to the legislature (presidential regimes) while
PRES0 to the EU-27 member states where it is, regardless of whether or not there is a
directly elected president (parliamentary regimes)24. DEM1 refers to the EU-27 mem-
ber states which have been democratic for more than 20 years (established democracies)
while DEM0 to EU-27 member states which became democracies in 1989 or later (new
democracies). Finally, EURO1 refers to the EU-27 member states which have adopted
the euro currency as their sole legal tender as of January 2009 while EURO0 to the re-
maining EU-27 member states (for more details on country classification see Table A.3.1
on page 32). Notice that in model (M.2) we allow the output growth to differ across
these subsamples, that is, we include a term that captures the annual difference in the
average GDP growth rate between the countries defined by D1 and the ones defined by
D0. This is important to ensure that our estimated results will not draw misleading
inferences regarding the cross country variations of PBCs, if these are driven by different
levels of economic growth across the various subsamples.
Equations (M.1) and (M.2) are standard dynamic panel data (DPD) specifications.
It is well known that when the unobserved country-specific effects are different across
countries, the simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator is biased. One way
to allow for cross-country differences in the time average of the dependent variable is
to employ Fixed Effects (FE) estimators. However, the inclusion of lagged depended
variables in equations (M.1) and (M.2) poses another source of bias with the OLS
estimation that cannot be eliminated by a FE regression, even if the number of countries
N tends to infinity. This bias arises because the initial condition, Yi0, is correlated with
the fixed-component µi, which creates correlation of order 1T (where T is the length of
the panel) between the lagged depended variable and the error term, εit25 (see Nickell,
1981; Kiviet, 1995). The length of the time series in our panel is relatively short (at
most 12 years when we consider the full sample period) and, hence, the bias from using
a FE estimator in these regressions is non-negligible. To address this problem we adopt
the difference GMM estimator developed by Arellano & Bond (1991) and the system
22Also known as winner-take-all/first past the post rule.
23In proportional representation candidates are elected based on the percent of votes received by their
party.
24Specifically, in systems with both a prime minister and a president, the system is classified as
presidential if either (i) the president can veto legislation and the parliament need a supermajority to
override the veto or (ii) the president can appoint and dismiss prime minister (and/or other ministers),
dissolve parliament and call for new elections.
25This bias could also spill over to our parameters of interest (parameters on electoral dummies) and
result in misleading inferences.
9GMM estimator outlined by Arellano & Bover (1995) and fully developed by Blundell
& Bond (1998). These estimators are designed for short, wide panels, and to fit linear
models with one dynamic dependent variable, additional controls and fixed effects (see
Appendix A.2 for an extensive discussion and the notes at the bottom of each Table
for details on the precise specification used). The consistency of the GMM estimator
depends on the validity of the assumption of no serial correlation in the error term (i.e.
no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced idiosyncratic errors) and on the
validity of the instruments. To check for serial correlation and that the instruments
are correctly specified, we perform two tests: the Arellano-Bond test for second-order
serial correlation of the differenced residuals, and the Hansen test for over-identifying
restrictions. Full details regarding these tests and the estimation procedure can be found
in Arellano & Bover (1995).
4 Evidence on Political Budget Cycles in the EU-27
4.1 Basic Findings
We start with tests on the government budget surplus/deficit as measured by the net
lending/borrowing figure of the general government. Column (1) in Table 4.1 reports
the results of the FE estimation of model (M.1) (page 6) and presents evidence in
favor of a PBC: the coefficient on the electoral dummy ELEit has the expected sign
(i.e. fiscal deficits are higher in elections years) and is statistically significant at the 1%
confidence level. This result is confirmed when we estimate the model using the two-step
Arellano-Bond procedure (column (2)) and the two-step Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond
procedure26 (column (3)). Since the system GMM estimator is asymptotically more
efficient than the difference GMM estimator and the inclusion of time-specific fixed
effects does not change the significance of the electoral dummy27 (see column (4)) we
stick to the benchmark regression of column (3) for the subsequent analysis. In column
(5) we reestimate the original fiscal balance equation with ELEit replaced by ELEPit
(coding predetermined elections) and ELENit (coding non-predetermined elections).
Both ELEPit and ELENit enter the regression negatively but only the former variable
is statistically significant (and qualitatively similar to ELEit in column (3)). This
suggests that the presence of PBC is not driven by strategically timed elections28 and
that fiscal manipulation is stronger when the election date is exogenously fixed by the
law. Having in mind that treating each election as predetermined underestimates the
size of PBCs, we continue our analysis using the weighted electoral variable WELEit
which assigns a weight of 0.5 to non-predetermined elections29. The coefficient estimate
onWELEit in column (6) implies that, on average, fiscal deficit increases by about 0.9%
of GDP in election years, once we weigh the impact of non-predetermined elections30.
An important issue is the robustness of this result over time. Once acceded to the
EU, in either 2004 or 2007, the 12 new members had to adjust their fiscal policies to the
26It worths mentioning that the one-step variant of the difference and system GMM estimators produce
results that sometimes reject the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions.
27In addition, the estimated coefficients on the time-specific fixed effects appear to be statistically
insignificant in all regressions.
28Endogenous election dates, which may be correlated with the economic cycle, are less likely to be
classified as predetermined.
29Notice that the χ2 statistic for testing the hypothesis that the coefficient on ELEPit equals two
times the coefficient on ELENPit is 0 while the corresponding p-value is close to 1 (see column (5) in
Table 4.1).
30This estimate is remarkably similar to the one reported in Shi & Svensson (2002, 2006) for a panel
data set consisting of 85 countries over a 21-year period (1975-1995).
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Table 4.1: Political Budget Cycles: Budget Surplus/Deficit
Dependent Variable: net lending (+) or borrowing (-) over GDP (NL)
Method: Fixed Effects (Column (1)), Generalised Method of Moments (Columns (2)-(7))
FE Diff.a Systemb
(1) (2) (3) (4)c (5) (6) (7)
post-2004
NL(-1) 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.63*** 0.76*** 0.63*** 0.56*** 0.63***
(8.86) (6.52) (7.82) (2.92) (6.15) (5.35) (5.98)
NL(-2) -0.13** -0.23* -0.17* -0.13 -0.17* -0.14 -0.45**
(2.18) (1.76) (1.94) (1.04) (1.91) (1.57) (2.40)
GROWTH 0.36*** 0.51*** 0.36*** 0.28 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.39***
(6.73) (3.67) (4.22) (1.05) (5.23) (4.28) (3.51)
LnGDP 0.90 5.48 1.15*** 0.10 1.25*** 1.23*** 1.50**
(0.68) (0.86) (3.34) (0.04) (3.11) (3.32) (2.52)
PROP1564 -0.15 -0.78 -0.16*** -0.43 -0.16*** -0.18** -0.21***
(0.65) (1.02) (3.64) (0.38) (2.95) (2.52) (5.85)
PROP65 0.02 0.15 0.40** 0.12 0.35* 0.45 0.50**
(0.18) (0.42) (2.34) (0.22) (1.71) (1.62) (2.42)
EXECRLC -0.04 -0.23 -0.76** -0.36* -0.35* -0.43** -0.21
(0.41) (1.15) (2.02) (1.91) (1.72) (2.02) (0.73)
ELE -0.93*** -0.73*** -0.86*** -0.81***
(4.14) (3.26) (3.78) (2.67)
ELEP -0.79***
(2.83)
ELENP -0.42
(0.42)
WELE -0.87*** -0.95***
(3.46) (2.69)
Hansen testd 22.14 21.34 14.73 20.98 23.56 21.22
[0.51] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [0.99] [0.57]
Corr. teste 1.26 1.12 0.89 1.12 0.95 0.43
[0.21] [0.26] [0.37] [0.26] [0.34] [0.66]
Sign. test 0.00f 0.46g
[0.98] [0.64]
No. countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
No. observ. 269 242 269 269 269 269 135
Adj. R2 0.68
Columns report estimated coefficients (z-statistics). Equations estimated using Windmeijer WC-robust stan-
dard errors and covariance. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respec-
tively. a Difference GMM regression (Arellano-Bond). b System GMM regressions (Arellano-Bover/Blundell-
Bond). The instruments used in the difference GMM regression are lagged levels (two periods) of the de-
pendent variable and the endogenous covariates GROWTHit and LnGDPit, and differences of the electoral
dummies and the strictly exogenous covariates PROP1564it, PROP65it and EXECRLCit . The instru-
ments used in the system GMM regression are lagged levels (two periods) of the dependent variable and
the endogenous covariates GROWTHit and LnGDPit for the differenced equation, and lagged difference
(one period) of these variables for the level equation. The electoral dummies and the strictly exogenous
covariates PROP1564it, PROP65it and EXECRLCit are instrumented by themselves in the differenced
equation. c Time-specific effects included as regressors. d Reports the Hansen test of the overidentifying
restrictions [p-values], where H0: overidentifying restrictions are valid. e Reports the Arellano-Bond test for
serial correlation of order two in the first-differenced residuals [p-values], where H0: no autocorrelation. f
Reports the χ2-statistic [p-value], where H0: the coefficient on ELEPit equals two times the coefficient on
ELENPit.
g Reports the z-statistic [p-value], where H0: the coefficient on WELEit in the post-2004 period
equals the coefficient on WELEit in pre-2004 period.
EU standards and comply with the SGP rules. Therefore, PBCs may be weaker in the
period following the EU enlargement of 2004. To investigate this issue, we restrict the
sample to include the post-2004 period and run the same regression as before. Column
(7) reports the corresponding results and presents evidence that politically-motivated
fiscal actions are not only a pre-2004 phenomenon: the coefficient value on WELEit
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in column (7), though slightly larger in absolute value, is qualitatively the same as the
one in column (6) and remains statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. We
also test the hypothesis that the coefficients on WELEit in the post-2004 period and
the pre-2004 period are equal31. As the two-tailed p-value for this test is 0.64 (column
(7)) there is no reason to reject the null hypothesis. It is worth mentioning that the
estimated coefficient on the partisan dummy EXECRLCit in columns (3) through (6)
has a negative sign (i.e. deficits are higher during left-wing administrations) and is
statistically significant at conventional levels of significance, but once we consider the
2004-2008 period it becomes insignificant (column (7)). This observation reinforces
the argument of Efthyvoulou (2008) that the adoption of fiscal consolidation policies
during the run-up to EU accession may not prevent PBCs but it can reduce the effect
of partisanship on fiscal policy outcomes.
We also experiment with an alternative election indicator that takes the timing of
an election in the course of the year into account32 (ELETit) but this variable fails
to capture electoral effects as accurately as WELEit. Moreover, controlling for fiscal
behavior in preelection and postelection years using the one-year leads and lags of the
executive election dates (labelled FWELEit and LWELEit) does not change the basic
findings, as reported in column (6). In fact, both FWELEit and LWELEit appear
to be statistically insignificant when added to the model, implying that fiscal policy
manipulations are only observable in election years. This finding is consistent with the
new generation PBCs models (see Section 1.1) where governments use short-term excess
borrowing as a hidden effort in order to increase their performance index. As pointed
out by Mink & de Haan (2005), borrowing extra money is less easy to hide during
a preelection year, compared to an election year, since information on the preelection
year’s budget deficit is likely to be published prior to the election date. Consequently,
engaging in fiscal manipulation too early may harm the chances of reelection faced by
the incumbent, especially if the electorate strongly prefers budgetary discipline.
Does the PBC displayed in Table 4.1 derive from fluctuations in expenditure or in
revenue? Conceptually, the answer is ambiguous. The choice of whether to increase
expenditure or reduce revenue around elections in any single country may vary over
time and over different elections, and hence, such effects may be difficult to detect in a
large panel of countries (see Alesina et al., 1997). Moreover, the predictions of PBCs
theories for expenditure and revenue differ. As emphasized by Persson & Tabellini
(2002), the precise predictions depend on the assumptions about the policy process,
the motivation of incumbents, and the information set of voters. Thus, we attempt to
answer the aforementioned question empirically with tests on the total expenditure and
the total revenue figures of the general government. Having in mind that some policy
instruments may be more easily and productively manipulated than others in elections
years (see Rogoff, 1990; Efthyvoulou, 2008), we also try to find electoral effects in com-
ponents and subcomponents of expenditure and revenue, namely current expenditure
and current revenue, and final consumption expenditure and total taxes33 respectively.
Table 4.2 presents the results of these regressions. The deficit cycle in the EU-27 over
the period 1999-2008 appears to be clearly driven by higher election-year expenditure:
31Assuming that the coefficients on the electoral dummy for the two sample periods are indepen-
dent, the z-statistic (the ratio of the difference of the coefficient estimates to the standard error of the
difference) is asymptotically normal.
32This indicator has been developed by Franzese (2000) and is calculated as ELETit =
(M−1)+ d
D
12
where M is the month of election, d is the day of election and D is the number of days in that month.
33We also consider other components of current expenditure and revenue but these two (i.e. final
consumption expenditure and taxes) seem to have the most pronounced electoral cycle. For the detailed
partition of expenditure and revenue into components and subcomponents see Table A.3.2 on page 32.
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Table 4.2: Political Budget Cycles: Compositional Effects
Dependent Variable: total expenditure (TEXP ), current expenditure (CEXP ), final cons
expenditure (FCE), total revenue (TREV ), current revenue (CREV ), total taxes (TAX)
(all shares of GDP)
Method: System Generalized Method of Moments (Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond)
TEXP CEXP FCE TREV CREV TAX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Y (-1)a 0.66*** 0.68*** 0.58*** 0.92*** 0.97*** 0.96***
(7.11) (4.54) (4.15) (7.97) (4.70) (7.05)
Y (-2)a 0.03 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07
(0.23) (0.08) (1.64) (0.25) (0.14) (0.48)
GROWTH -0.51*** -0.41*** -0.22*** 0.01 0.04 0.14***
(5.56) (15.41) (6.10) (0.08) (0.99) (3.27)
LnGDP 0.65 1.07*** 0.24 0.81** 0.55 0.88***
(1.54) (2.74) (1.26) (2.16) (0.97) (4.05)
PROP1564 0.20** 0.17*** 0.09*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.05
(2.51) (3.34) (5.11) (0.11) (0.45) (1.50)
PROP65 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.09 0.16
(0.36) (0.50) (0.34) (0.35) (1.15) (1.40)
EXECRLC 0.08 -0.08 0.16** -0.01 0.04 -0.01
(0.53) (0.97) (2.26) (0.04) (0.25) (0.05)
WELE 0.75** 0.36** 0.19* -0.20 -0.32 -0.21
(2.49) (2.37) (1.95) (0.88) (1.63) (1.18)
Hansen testb 20.62 20.49 19.32 22.84 18.96 21.38
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [0.99] [1.00] [1.00]
Corr. testc 0.96 0.71 -0.36 0.40 0.13 0.56
[0.34] [0.48] [0.71] [0.69] [0.90] [0.57]
No. countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
No. observ. 267 269 269 267 267 269
a Y (-j) denotes the autoregressive coefficient at lag j, where j = 1, 2. Columns report estimated coeffi-
cients (z-statistics). Equations estimated using Windmeijer WC-robust standard errors and covariance.
***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. The instruments
used in the system GMM regression are lagged levels (two periods) of the dependent variable and the
endogenous covariates GROWTHit and LnGDPit for the differenced equation, and lagged difference
(one period) of these variables for the level equation. The electoral dummy WELEit and the strictly
exogenous covariates PROP1564it, PROP65it and EXECRLCit are instrumented by themselves in
the differenced equation. b Reports the Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions [p-values], where
H0: overidentifying restrictions are valid. c Reports the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation of order
two in the first-differenced residuals [p-values], where H0: no autocorrelation.
the estimated coefficient on the electoral variable WELEit has the expected sign and is
statistically significant at the 5% confidence level in the TEXPit and CEXPit equations
(column (1) and (2)) and at the 10% confidence level in the FCEit equation (column
(3)). The estimates suggest that, on average, total expenditure, current expenditure
and final consumption expenditure, increase by about 0.8%, 0.4% and 0.2% of GDP
respectively during an election year. On the other hand, the electoral variableWELEit
enters the equations of TREVit, CREVit and TAXit (columns (4)-(6)) with the appro-
priate sign (i.e. revenue measures relative to GDP tend to reduce in election years) but
the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant (the highest z-statistic is 1.63
and is obtained when we test for electoral effects in current revenue)34. These findings
seem to persist when we run the same regressions for the post-2004 period and when
we control for fiscal behavior in preelection years. However, when we add to the basic
regressions the variable LWELEit (coding postelection years), the estimated coefficient
34One interpretation is that tax codes are more difficult to change and controlled for short-run purposes
compared to certain visible and politically sensitive expenditure programs (i.e. transfer payments).
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on WELEit in the equations of CEXPit and TAXit becomes statistically significant
at the 10% confidence level and retains its negative sign, adding evidence that current
revenue and taxes may also be manipulated in a discretionary way around elections.
4.2 Do PBCs vary across the EU-27 member states?
Persson & Tabellini (2002, 2003) argue that the nature of the political system may
shape fiscal policy outcomes. More precisely, they suggest that electoral accountability
and incentives to perform well are stronger under plurality rule than under proportional
rule (as the electoral outcome is more sensitive to marginal changes in votes) and thus
“plurality elections” should exhibit larger variation in spending and taxes. Furthermore,
they suggest that legislators’ incentives to stick together and to vote according to party
or coalition lines is weaker in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems (as
the executive can not be brought down by the legislature) and thus, one should observe
larger overall spending and larger broad programs (i.e. social transfers, national public
goods) in parliamentary regimes. Persson, Tabellini and several co-authors find empiri-
cal support for these predictions. On the other hand, Brender & Drazen (2005) explain
that electoral fiscal manipulations may work only when voters lack the necessary in-
formation to draw inferences about government performance from economic outcomes,
as well as the ability to process that information correctly, and hence PBCs are more
likely to occur in countries with less of an electoral history, namely new democracies.
Moreover, they show empirically that only in these new democracies the political system
matters, consistent with Persson and Tabellini’s arguments. Following this discussion,
we investigate whether the PBCs found in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 vary systematically
with electoral rules, the form of government and the length of time a country has been
a democracy. In addition, we examine whether the Eurozone countries induce more
pronounced PBCs compared to the non-Eurozone countries, as fiscal policy is the only
instrument for them to influence voters perceptions around elections. To carry out this
analysis, we estimate the same regression as in the previous section using the specifica-
tion suggested in model (M.2) (page 8).
Table 4.3 reports the findings on NLit, CEXPit and CREVit35. Different elec-
toral rules do not seem to generate different PBCs in the EU-27. We find that the
election-year reduction in budget surplus and current revenue and the election-year rise
in current expenditure identified in the previous subsection are common to both plurality
and non-plurality elections (see columns (1)-(3)), even though the estimated coefficients
on WELE∗D1it (coding executive elections in countries with plurality rule) are uni-
formly higher than those on WELE∗D0it (coding executive elections in countries with
proportional rule). On the other hand, the split according to the form of government
suggests that the existence of PBCs in the EU-27 is due predominantly to the parlia-
mentary regimes: only the coefficients on WELE∗D0it (coding executive elections in
parliamentary countries) have the correct sign and are statistically significant at con-
ventional levels of significance (see columns (4)-(6)). However, these estimates may be
biased due to significantly lower frequency of presidential countries in our sample (only
3 countries have presidential systems: Cyprus, Lithuania and Poland). As the electoral
effects for the parliamentary countries are quite the same with the ones for all countries
(as presented in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2), one has to be very cautious in drawing in-
ferences about differences in PBCs in the EU-27 across different forms of government.
Continuing with the partition of the sample in established and new democracies, we
35Using TEXPit or FCEit, instead of CEXPit, and TREVit or TAXit, instead of CREVit, as a
fiscal policy outcome produces similar results and leads to the same conclusions.
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find evidence against the argument of Brender & Drazen (2005) that election-driven
fiscal policy manipulations are only a phenomenon of new democracies. In fact, the
results displayed in columns (7) through (9) indicate stronger electoral effects among
the established democracies: the coefficients on both WELE∗D1it (coding executive
elections in established democracies) and WELE∗D0it (coding executive elections in
new democracies) have the expected sign but only the former variable is statistically
significant in the equations of NLit and CEXPit. However, this is not so surprising if
we take into account that 14 out of the 17 established democracies have also adopted
the euro and as the above discussion suggests electoral effects may be stronger in these
countries. Indeed, the results in columns (10) through (12) imply that the PBCs in the
EU-27 identified in the previous subsection are driven by the countries in the euro area.
The estimated coefficients on WELE∗D1it (coding executive elections in the Eurozone)
are larger than the ones on WELEit (as presented in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2) and sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels of significance (even the one in the equation
of CREVit). Specifically, the estimated election-year reductions in budget surplus and
current revenue amount to about 1.3% and 0.4% of GDP respectively while the esti-
mated election-year rise in current expenditure to about 0.5% of GDP. In contrast, the
estimated coefficients on WELE∗D0it (coding executive elections in the non-Eurozone
countries) are all statistically insignificant and, in two cases, have the wrong sign. As
already mentioned, one interpretation of this finding is that the countries that haven’t
yet adopted the euro may use a different combination of instruments (monetary and
fiscal) to generate politically-motivated economic outcomes and this combination may
change over time. Another possible explanation is that there are also some other fea-
tures that may affect politicians’ incentives and willingness to manipulate fiscal policy
prior to elections, and once we identify and control for these features PBCs may become
detectable in all countries. We now turn to this possibility.
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5 PBCs with Non-Economic Voting and Competitiveness
The underlying feature of PBCs models is that rational but uninformed voters reward
good performance in office with their vote, creating incentives for incumbent politicians
to appear competent (and perform well) just ahead of elections. Having that in mind, it
is reasonable to assume that politicians’ incentives to manipulate fiscal policy prior to an
election depend on how sensitive the reelection probability is to their competence level.
The empirical model specification in Section 3 and the empirical analysis conducted in
Section 4, rely on the assumption that neither politicians nor the electorate observe this
sensitivity parameter and that politicians’ incentives may only be shaped by different
electoral rules and different forms of government (as suggested by the existing line of
theoretical and empirical research on PBCs). However, with the development of more
extensive public opinion surveys in the late nineteenth century, information related to
voters’ perceptions and voting intentions has become readily available, leading to a
precise evaluation of the aforementioned sensitivity parameter (through evaluation of
the relative weight voters assign to non-economic issues and of the uncertainty over the
electoral outcome). To the extent that a higher level of non-economic voting and a lower
level of competitiveness reduce the power of politicians’ incentives to appear competent
prior to elections36 (see also Section 1), a puzzle emerges: To what extent do these two
features explain the variability in the size and composition of PBCs? This question
takes on particular importance in the EU context, where the citizens have full access
to free media, and hence to all the information required to draw such inferences. Thus,
the aim of this section is to answer this question empirically using data drawn from
the EU-27 member states. To do so, we first describe the variables used to proxy for
the levels of non-economic voting and competitiveness and explain how these variables
are introduced in the empirical model specification, and then present the corresponding
results. For a detailed discussion on how these two features (i.e non-economic voting and
competitiveness) affect the size of PBCs within a theoretical framework, see Appendix
A.1.
5.1 Proxies and Empirical Model Specification
We start with the level of non-economic voting. We construct two proxies based on re-
sponses to Eurobarometer survey items37 concerning economic and social aspects of the
EU citizens’ lives for the period 2003-200838. The first one, denoted by BETit, relies on
the following question linked to pocketbook and prospective voting39: “Looking ahead
36Specifically, the higher the level of non-economic voting, the weaker are politicians’ incentives to
manipulate fiscal policy in order to enhance their chance of reelection, as fewer voters can be influenced
by an electoral expenditure boom. A lower level of competitiveness (i.e. the closeness of the incumbent
and the challenger in the electoral race) has the same effect, as the electoral outcome becomes less
sensitive to marginal changes in votes.
37The “Standard Eurobarometer” is conducted between 2 and 5 times per year, with reports published
twice yearly (Spring and Autumn issues). Each survey consists in approximately 1000 face-to-face in-
terviews per member state (except Germany: 1500, Luxembourg: 600, United Kingdom: 1300 including
300 in Northern Ireland). The proxies constructed for this analysis depend on yearly averages of the
survey items taken into consideration.
38Data for the new EU member states is not available before 2003. Thus, our analysis focuses mainly
on how the level of non-economic voting varies across countries, and relatively less on how it varies over
time (only 13 countries have two executive elections during the period 2003-2008).
39Pocketbook voting captures the conventional wisdom among politicians and the public that voters
vote according to their personal or household financial conditions. Prospective voting involves the
theoretical prediction that voters look to the future, instead of the past (retrospective voting), and vote
according to economic expectations. See Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier (2007) for extensive reviews of the
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to the next year, do you think that the financial situation of your household will be
better, worse or stay the same?”. We expect that the respondents who think that their
financial situation will improve over the coming year are less likely to base their votes
predominately on economic criteria, compared to those who think that it will deterio-
rate. This implies that in countries which are for the most part optimistic (with respect
to citizens’ personal financial well-being), the impact that non-economic issues have on
vote choice will be relatively larger. The variable BETit is computed as the percentage
of the responders whose answer is “better” (as a share of the responders whose answer is
either “better” or “worse”) in country i and year t, rescaled by subtracting the mean of
this index across all 27 countries in year t. The latter rescaling procedure is important to
reduce measurement errors caused by the existence of an “economic ill-being factor” in
European public opinion during particular time periods (e.g. during the global economic
crisis of 2008). The second proxy, denoted by NECit, relies on a more direct question
on issue importance linked to sociotropic voting40, namely, “What do you think are the
two most important issues facing your country at the moment?”. Survey participants
have the option to choose from fifteen items touching a broad range of social, cultural,
and policy issues: crime, economic situation, inflation, taxation, unemployment, terror-
ism, foreign affairs, housing, immigration, healthcare system, the educational system,
pensions, environment, energy related issues, and other (spontaneous). The variable
NECit is computed as the proportion of responses in country i and year t to items as-
sociated with non-economic issues41, rescaled, just like before, by subtracting the mean
across all 27 countries in year t.
To test whether the level of non-economic voting can explain the variation in the
size of PBCs across the EU-27 member states, we augment model (M.1) (page 6) with
the public opinion variable POLit ∈ {BETit, NECit} and its interaction term with
the electoral dummy, WELE∗POLit. A potential econometric problem is that the
variable POLit may not be exogenous relative to the dependent variable and thus it
may create endogeneity bias from reverse causation: voters assigning higher (lower)
weight to non-economic issues during periods of expansionary (contractionary) fiscal
policy. To cope with this problem we replace the problematic causal variable POLit
with the instrumental variable IV POLit ∈ {IV BETit, IV NECit}, constructed using
the predicted values from country-by-country regressions on the exogenous variables of
theoretical and empirical literature on economic voting.
40Sociotropic voting involves the theoretical prediction that national economic predictions matter to
individual vote choice. In the majority of political studies on economic voting, researchers find that
instead of personal finances, voters are more likely to be considering the national economic situation
when casting their vote (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007).
41To divide the issues into “economic” and “non-economic”, we use a classification framework similar
to the one of Lewis-Beck (1990). More precisely, the list of economic issues includes items related to
macroeconomic outcomes or fiscal policy instruments, i.e. economic situation, inflation, unemployment,
taxation and pensions, while the list of non-economic issues includes items with a social, political or
cultural dimension (even if they are indirectly influenced by government’s economic policies), i.e. crime,
terrorism, foreign affairs, immigration, housing, healthcare system, the educational system, environment,
and energy related issues.
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the model42, and run dynamic panel regressions of the following form:
Yit =
2∑
j=1
αjYit−j + βXit + γGROWTHit + δWELEit+
ζ1WELE∗IV POLit + ζ2IV POLit + µi + εit (M.3)
Finally, in order to examine the impact of the two public opinion indicators simultane-
ously, we substitute the first two variables on the second line of model (M.3) with the
variables COMPit and WELE∗COMPit, where COMPit is the standardized average
of IV BETit and IV NECit43.
We continue with the level of competitiveness44. We employ preelectoral poll data on
voting intention for the period 2004-2008 and construct a proxy based on the difference in
the polled vote share between the government and the opposition (after adjusting for the
allocation of undecided voters). In countries with two leading parties (such as the United
Kingdom, Greece and Malta), constructing this index is quite simple. In the remaining
countries though, multiparty coalitions form governments, and the classification of all
parties along government-opposition lines is more difficult; party alliances are usually
reshaped around elections. To avoid measurement errors related to such ambiguities, we
focus on the largest government party and the largest opposition party45. More precisely,
the “competitiveness proxy”, denoted by V OTit, is calculated as the mean monthly
difference in the polled vote share between the largest government party and the largest
opposition party, plus the mean monthly change of this difference46 - to capture upward
42The predicted values are estimates of the mean of POLit conditional upon the exogenous variables
of the model (obtained separately for each country which provides identification):
P̂OLit = pˆi0i + pˆi1iPROP1564it + pˆi2iPROP65it + pˆi3iEXECRLCit + pˆi4iWELEit
Note that these first-stage regressions have all high adjusted-R2 values (almost all are more than 0.40).
Moreover, including as instruments the responses to other Eurobarometer survey items (i.e. the level of
trust in national political institutions) does not change the overall significance of these regressions, nor
the significance of the results to be presented later on.
43Specifically, COMPit =
1
2
× [ IV BETit−IV BET it
StD(IV BETit)
+ IV NECit−IV NECit
StD(IV NECit)
], where x¯ is the mean of x and
StD(x) is the standard deviation of x.
44Given the complexity of the conditions that affect the competitiveness of elections both from the
perspective of politicians’ as well as voters’ incentives to make an effort in the electoral contest, simple
measures, such as party system fragmentation cannot serve as empirical tracers of competitiveness. As
Boix & Strokes (2007) point out, while party system fragmentation has often been considered to boost
electoral competitiveness by increasing uncertainty of electoral victory, the opposite may be true because
fragmentation tends to reduce the identifiability of governing coalitions.
45Information on the largest government and opposition parties is retrieved from the Database of
Political Institutions of the World Bank (Beck et al., 2001). Note that in 94% of the cases, the chief
executive comes from (or is not nominated by) the largest party in the coalition.
46The vote share difference and the mean monthly change in the polls are calculated from data
available to the market up to 12 months before the election. This includes 21 and 48 polls for Austrian
elections in 2006 and 2008 respectively, 7 for Belgian elections in 2007, 16 for Bulgarian elections in
2005, 8 for Cypriot elections in 2008, 27 for Czech elections in 2006, 12 and 28 for Danish elections in
2005 and 2007 respectively, 7 for Estonian elections in 2007, 17 for Finnish elections in 2007, 25 for
French elections in 2007, 348 for German elections in 2005, 6 and 35 for Greek elections in 2004 and
2007 respectively, 16 for Hungarian elections in 2006, 22 for Irish elections in 2007, 55 and 10 for Italian
elections in 2006 and 2008 respectively, 6 for Latvian elections in 2006, 5 for Lithuanian elections in
2004, 14 for Maltese elections in 2008, 46 for Dutch elections in 2006, 19 for Polish elections in 2005,
8 for Portuguese elections in 2005, 5 and 15 for Romanian elections in 2004 and 2008 respectively, 15
for Slovak elections in 2006, 3 and 7 for Slovenian elections in 2004 and 2008 respectively, 16 and 38
for Spanish elections in 2004 and 2008 respectively, 54 for Swedish elections in 2006 and 75 for UK
elections in 2005. Since poll data for the Luxembourgian elections in 2004 is not available, we use as a
measure the difference in the actual vote share between the largest government party and the largest
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or downward trends47. Using the sampling distribution of V OTit (see Figure 5.1), we
divide the 34 executive elections in the EU-27 over the sample period 2004-2008 into
three groups and create the following election indicators (dummy variables)48: C1,
coding elections with a high level of competitiveness (i.e. |V OTit| < 6%), C2, coding
elections with an average level of competitiveness (i.e. 6% ≤ |V OTit| < 15%), and C3,
coding elections with a low level of competitiveness (i.e. |V OTit| ≥ 15%). Thus, in order
to examine whether the uncertainty over the electoral outcome affects the dimension
of PBCs (after controlling for non-economic voting), we reestimate model (M.3) with
WELEit (on the first line) replaced by WELE∗C1it, WELE∗C2it and WELE∗C3it.
Figure 5.1: Probability Density Functions of V OTit and DV OTit
Furthermore, we subtract from the variable V OTit the actual vote share difference
between the two parties in the previous executive election, and use the resulting vari-
able DV OTit as an “alternative competitiveness proxy”49. A positive value of DV OTit
implies a stronger preelectoral support for the incumbent government compared to the
previous election, and thus should be associated with a relatively high probability of
reelection. Following the same procedure as before, we use the sampling distribution of
DV OTit (see Figure 5.1) to create the election indicators R1, R2 and R350, and consider
the impact of the interaction terms WELE∗R1it, WELE∗R2it and WELE∗R3it on
the various fiscal policy instruments.
opposition party - the correlation coefficient between V OTit and the corresponding actual index across
all countries is 0.77. However, excluding Luxembourg from the panel of countries does not change the
results to be presented in Section 5.3.
47For a nontechnical discussion on how to convert preelectoral polls into probabilities see Alesina et al.
(1997).
48Even though the use of dummy variables reduces the informational content of V OTit, it can block
the noise created by various electoral laws across countries - which may determine the number of seats
controlled by each party - and provides results that are not so sensitive to outliers.
49It worths mentioning that any incumbency advantage is already incorporated into the polling results.
That is, the party of a popular chief executive should do well in the polls, and therefore the variable
DV OTit reflects that popularity.
50R1 codes elections with −7% < DV OTit < 0%, R2 codes elections with −17% < DV OTit ≤ −7%
or 0% ≤ DV OTit < 10% and R3 codes elections with DV OTit ≤ −17% or DV OTit ≥ 10%. Notice
that DV OTit value of zero provides an indication that the support for the incumbent government has
not changed since it was elected, and hence should be associated with a lower level of competitiveness
compared to a V OTit value of zero.
20
5.2 Empirical Results
Table 5.1 reports the results of the GMM estimation of model (M.3) (page 18), that
is, when IV BETit, IV NECit and COMPit, as well as their interaction terms with
the electoral dummy WELEit, are added to the baseline equations of NLit, TEXPit,
CEXPit and FCEit, for the (adjusted) sample period 2004-200851. Table 5.1 also re-
ports the χ2-statistic for a test of the hypothesis that the coefficients on these added
regressors are jointly equal to zero. As the coefficient estimate on the interaction term
measures how the electoral effect varies among countries/years with different levels of
non-economic voting, we expect this to be opposite in sign to the coefficient estimate
on WELEit (i.e. positive in the equation of budget surplus/deficit and negative in
the equations of the three expenditure measures). The results of the regressions with
IV BETit (columns (1)-(4)) are in line with these predictions: both the election dummy
WELEit and the interaction term WELE∗IV BETit enter with the appropriate signs
and are statistically highly significant, suggesting that higher levels of non-economic
voting (and thus weaker incentives for politicians to influence voters’ perceptions before
elections) are associated with smaller PBCs. On the other hand, the results of the re-
gressions with IV NECit (columns (5)-(8)) validate the aforementioned hypothesis for
the overall budget deficit, but fail to do the same for the three expenditure measures:
the interaction term WELE∗IV NECit has the expected sign but is not statistically
significant at conventional levels of significance (the highest z-statistic, obtained in the
equation of TEXPit, is 1.56)52. However, when we consider the standardized average
of IV BETit and IV NEC (columns (9)-(12)), the results are similar to the ones dis-
played in columns (1) through (4) and in three out of four cases the interaction term
WELE∗COMPit appears to have a higher z-statistic53. The latter implies that a com-
bination of the two public opinion indicators provides a better measure to capture the
level of non-economic and evaluate its impact on the size of PBCs. The findings are also
qualitatively important. For example, the pattern of estimates in column (9) implies
that the election-induced increase in budget deficit in the country/year with the lowest
level of non-economic voting (i.e. COMPit = −1.22) is 2.5% of GDP higher than in
the country/year with the highest level of non-economic voting (i.e. COMPit = 2.08).
The corresponding figures for TEXPit, CEXPit and FCEit (as calculated from the
estimates in columns (10), (11) and (12)) are 2.5%, 0.9% and 1.0% of GDP respectively.
Note that once again we fail to find any evidence in favor of a PBC in the three rev-
enue measures: controlling for the impact of non-economic voting does not improve the
results presented in Section 4 for TREVit, CREVit and TAXit.
Columns (5) through (8) of Table 5.2 report the results when the electoral dummy
WELEit in columns (9) through (12) of Table 5.1 is replaced by the interaction terms
WELE∗C1it, WELE∗C2it and WELE∗C3it (coding elections with high, average and
low levels of competitiveness, as determined by the variable V OTit). We can see that
all three election indicators appear to have the correct sign but only WELE∗C1it is
statistically significant at conventional levels of significance in all four equations. This
rhymes well with the general idea mentioned in the introduction and emphasized in
the first paragraph of Section 5, namely, politicians are more responsive to public de-
mands (and thus generate more pronounced PBCs) when electoral competition is high
(i.e. the difference in the polled vote share between the government and the opposi-
51See columns (1) through (4) in Table 5.2.
52These findings may be driven to some extent by the relative importance of pocketbook versus
sociotropic effects.
53Although WELE∗COMPit does not enter the regression of FCEit significantly, it remains jointly
statistically significant with the separate regressor COMPit.
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tion is relatively small). Considering the alternative election indicators WELE∗R1it,
WELE∗R2it and WELE∗R3it (coding elections with high, average and low level of
competitiveness, as determined by the variable DV OTit), produces even stronger re-
sults. As shown in columns (9) through (12) of Table 5.2, the estimated coefficient on
WELE∗R1it is statistical significant in all four equations (at the 5% confidence level
or better), the one on WELE∗R2it is statistical significant in the equation of NLit
only (at the 10% confidence level), whereas the one on WELE∗R3it does not appear
to be statistically significant in any of the equations. The latter is not surprising since
politicians have no reason to manipulate fiscal policy when they are certain of winning
or losing an election. Qualitatively, the findings suggest that when we focus on elections
with high electoral competition54, the estimated election-year increases in budget deficit,
total expenditure, current expenditure and final consumption expenditure amount on
average to 1.5%, 1.5%, 1.0% and 0.4% of GDP respectively, that is, 0.5%, 0.5%, 0.3%
and 0.1% of GDP above the ones reported in the baseline regressions for all executive
elections (columns (1)-(4) in Table 5.2). It is worth mentioning that the coefficients on
WELE∗COMPit in columns (5) through (12) remain economically and statistically sig-
nificant (or jointly statistically significant with COMPit)55, which lends support to the
view that both competitiveness and non-economic voting shape politicians’ incentives
around elections and simultaneously determine the size of PBCs. Several robustness
tests, such as using alternative specifications with IV BETit and IV NECit, or leaving
the two variables on non-economic voting out of the model specification, do not change
the variability of PBCs with respect to the level of competitiveness. Finally, repeating
the same analysis for the three revenue measures (i.e. introducing competitiveness into
the regressions of TREVit, CREVit and TAXit) reveals no modification of previous
results.
5.2.1 Do PBCs still vary across Eurozone / non-Eurozone countries?
Among the key findings in Section 4.2 is that PBCs in the EU-27 over the full sam-
ple period are uniquely associated with the Eurozone countries. This result seems to
persist when we consider the shorter sample period 2004-2008 (see columns (1)-(4)
in Table 5.3): both WELE∗EURO1it (coding executive elections in the Eurozone)
and WELE∗EURO0it (coding executive elections in the non-Eurozone countries) have
the expected signs but only the former variable is statistically significant at conven-
tional levels of significance in the equations of NLit, TEXPit and CEXPit. Having
in mind that the average levels of non-economic voting and competitiveness may differ
between the two subsamples56, the reader may legitimately ask whether after control-
ling for variations in these two features across countries, there is still a difference in
the size of PBCs between the Eurozone and the non-Eurozone countries. To answer
this question, we create two pairs of indicator variables following the approach of the
previous subsection: WELE∗C12∗EURO1 (coding elections in the Eurozone with high
or average level of competitiveness) and WELE∗C12∗EURO0 (coding elections in the
non-Eurozone countries with high or average level of competitiveness), and analogously,
WELE∗R12∗EURO1it and WELE∗R12∗EURO0it. Columns (5) through (12) in Ta-
54In this case when the support for the incumbent government has declined by a relatively small
percentage since it was elected.
55With the exception of the specification in column (8).
56In fact, the average level of non-economic voting is lower and the average level of competitiveness is
higher for the Eurozone countries, compared to the non-Eurozone countries. For example, the difference
in the average COMPit values and in the average DV OTit values between the two groups is 0.5 and
0.7 standard deviations of the pooled sample, respectively.
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ble 5.3 display the results when we use these new indicators57 to estimate the same
regression package as in Table 5.2. It seems that non-economic voting and competi-
tiveness can indeed account (to a large extent) for the difference in the dimension of
election-driven fiscal policy manipulations between the two subsamples of EU countries.
More precisely, once we add to the baseline regression the variables WELE∗COMPit
and COMPit and drop the elections with low level of competitiveness (captured by
WELE∗C3it or WELE∗R3it), PBCs become identifiable in both Eurozone and non-
Eurozone countries: both WELE∗C12∗EURO1 and WELE∗C12∗EURO0, and anal-
ogously WELE∗R12∗EURO1it and WELE∗R12∗EURO0it, appear to be statistically
significant at conventional levels of significance in the equations of NLit, TEXPit and
CEXPit (see columns (5)-(7) and columns (9)-(11) respectively). The latter finding
clearly indicates that it is very important to evaluate the information available to the
market prior to an election, before we draw conclusions regarding which national and
supranational politico-institutional features matter for the appearance of PBCs.
57Together with WELE∗C3it (or analogously, WELE∗R3it) - coding elections with low level of
competitiveness - for which we found no electoral effects in the previous subsection.
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6 Conclusions
This paper examines how incumbent governments across the EU tend to manipulate
fiscal policy in order to enhance their reelection perspectives. Using a data set en-
compassing all 27 current member states and employing a system GMM estimation
technique, we find strong evidence in favor of a systematic electoral cycle in the overall
budget deficit, derived mainly from increased government expenditure. More precisely,
the estimates for the 1997-2008 period suggest that fiscal deficit increases by about
1% of GDP, whereas, total expenditure, current expenditure, and final consumption
expenditure by about 0.8%, 0.4% and 0.2% of GDP, respectively, during an election
year. These effects seem to persist when we restrict the sample to include the post-2004
period, and when we control for the impact of non-predetermined (strategically timed)
elections. Furthermore, we find hardly any evidence that PBCs in the EU vary under
different electoral rules nor that they are driven by the experience of new democracies,
as suggested by Brender & Drazen (2005). On the other hand, we detect significantly
larger, and statistically more robust, electoral effects in the Eurozone countries than in
the countries that have not yet adopted the euro. To further analyze the variability in
the size of PBCs across countries and identify which factors account for their existence,
this paper also attempts to formulate a more realistic approach to government’s reaction
function around elections. More precisely, we argue that the relative weight voters assign
to non-economic issues and the uncertainty over the electoral outcome (or electoral com-
petitiveness) may shape politicians incentives when they face elections and thus should
be capable of capturing variations in the size of PBCs across countries. In light of these
arguments, we construct suitable proxies for these two features and provide evidence
that incumbent governments in the EU tend to generate more pronounced PBCs when
the level of non-economic voting is relatively low and when electoral competitiveness
is intense. Finally, we show that these two features can explain, to a large extent, the
difference in the size of PBCs between the Eurozone and the non-Eurozone countries.
The latter findings imply that we need to dig deeper into the individual characteristics
of each electoral competition, and take into account all the information available to the
market prior to an election to answer the question of where (or when) PBCs are expected
to appear. Thus, generalizations linked to standard politico-institutional aspects (which
affect the process of fiscal policy formation), may sometimes produce misleading results.
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A Appendix
A.1 Theoretical Model
In this section we describe a simple version of the model of electoral cycles with seignor-
age developed by Persson & Tabellini (2000)58. We consider an economy with two main
actors: a government (or an incumbent politician) and voters (who also play the role of
consumers). Let us write the government budget constraint as
gt = ηt(τ¯ y + st) (A.1)
where gt is the government expenditure in period t, τ¯ is the fixed percentage rate of
taxes, y is the average income, st denotes “seignorage” or, more generally, a hidden and
distorting tax observed and paid by the voters only after the elections, and ηt represents
the incumbent’s competence level (ability to handle the economy; increase government
expenditure using the given tax revenue). Voters’ welfare in period t, denoted by wt, is
given by
wt = y(1− τ¯)− st − V (st) + λgt (A.2)
where V (.) is a function capturing the distortions of seignorage59, so that V (0) = 0,
V ′(.) > 0 for st > 0 and V ′′(.) > 0, and λ ≥ 1 is an exogenous parameter. To simplify
the analysis, the voters’ marginal utility from public consumption is assumed constant
(i.e. voters are risk-neutral). As is common in these models, the competence is a moving
average process of order 160, determined by
ηt = ϑt + ϑt−1 (A.3)
where ϑt is drawn from a continuous uniform distribution with support that covers
[1− 12ϕ , 1 + 12ϕ ] and is serially uncorrelated. Thus, its mean value is equal to 1 and its
probability density is equal to ϕ. Notice that ϕ represents the sensitivity of reelection
probability to the level of incumbent’s competence, which is assumed to be constant
over time. We further assume that policy decisions in each period t are made before
knowing the realization of ϑt and that the realization of ϑt−1 is known to everyone.
Incumbent politician maximizes voter’s welfare and some exogenous “ego rents”61
R > 0 according to
E(wt|ϑt−1) + ptR (A.4)
where pt is the probability that the incumbent is reelected. For simplicity we set R
equal to 1. The sequence of the stage game at time t is as follows: (1) the politician
chooses st, given ϑt−1 and without observing ϑt. (2) Nature determines ϑt. (3) Voters
observe gt only. (4) If t is an on-election period, voters reelect the incumbent politician
58The model was originally formulated by Holmstrom (1982) to describe how career concerns shape
the incentives of managers inside an organization. Persson & Tabellini (2000) show how to adapt this
model to a political setup.
59Note that the quantity st can also represent public borrowing and V (.) the cost function of public
borrowing.
60Thus, competence changes over time, but slowly: if a policymaker was competent yesterday, he
retains some of his competence today, though some may depend on new factors. This is a plausible
assumption since circumstances change over time and a policy-maker that is competent in some tasks
in one period need not be competent on other tasks in other periods. The MA(1) specification is also
convenient because it does not allow competence to carry over for more than two periods (i.e. if after
the election the challenger replaces the incumbent).
61These exogenous rents reflect the value attached to winning the elections and holding office, but
they do not appear in the government budget.
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or elect a new contender drawn from the same distribution. If t is an off-election period,
we move to the election period. The stage game is infinitely repeated.
Under these assumptions, the equilibrium in off-election periods is straightforward,
as the incumbent maximizes voters’ welfare only. Even though the quantity of seignorage
in the current period t reveals incumbent’s ϑt, the voters do not care about it, as elections
take place only in period t + 1. At that point, voters will look ahead at period t + 2.
By (A.3),
E(ηt+2|gt+1) = E(ϑt+2|gt+1) + E(ϑt+1|gt+1) = 1 + ϑt+1 (A.5)
Hence knowledge of ϑt in period t is irrelevant for the voters and the incumbent politician
sets st at the socially optimal level. More formally, the incumbent politician maximizes
E(wt|ϑt−1), which after substituting (A.1) and (A.3) into (A.2), can be written as
E(wt|ϑt−1) = y(1− τ¯)− st − V (st) + λ(1 + ϑt−1)(τ¯ y + st) (A.6)
Solving the FOC for st, we get
−1− V ′(st) + λ(1 + ϑt−1) = 0 or
V ′(st) = λ(1 + ϑt−1)− 1 (A.7)
In on-election periods, on the other hand, things are different. When period t+ 1
comes, the value of ϑt+1 is not irrelevant for the voters, as shown by (A.5). Even though
voters do not directly observe ϑt+1, they can infer it from gt+1 and beliefs about the
level of seignorage. Denote the voters’ guesses about ϑt+1 and st+1 as ϑ˜t+1 and s˜t+1
respectively. From the budget constraint, we have
gt+1 = (ϑ˜t+1 + ϑt)(τ¯ y + s˜t+1) or
ϑ˜t+1 =
gt+1
τ¯ y + s˜t+1
− ϑt (A.8)
Inserting equation (A.1) (one period ahead) into the numerator of the first term on the
right-hand side of (A.8) gives
ϑ˜t+1 =
τ¯ y + st+1
τ¯ y + s˜t+1
(ϑt+1 + ϑt)− ϑt (A.9)
The voters’ behavior is then simple to describe: the incumbent is reappointed only if
ϑ˜t+1 exceeds his opponent’s expected competence:
p˜t+1 =
{
1 iff ϑ˜t+1 ≥ 1
0 otherwise
(A.10)
As the incumbent politician does not know yet his own competence, his probability of
reelection, as perceived in period t + 1 when choosing the level of seignorage, is given
by pt+1 = Pr(p˜t+1 = 1) = Pr(ϑ˜t+1 ≥ 1). Using equation (A.9) we can write this
probability as
Pr
(
τ¯ y + st+1
τ¯ y + s˜t+1
(ϑt+1 + ϑt)− ϑt ≥ 1
)
or
Pr
(
ϑt+1 ≥ τ¯ y + s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
− ϑt st+1 − s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
)
(A.11)
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which can be calculated using the cumulative distribution function of ϑt+162. That is,
Pr
(
ϑt+1 ≥ τ¯ y + s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
− ϑt st+1 − s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
)
=
1
2
+ ϕ
(
1− τ¯ y + s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
+ ϑt
st+1 − s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
)
=
1
2
+ ϕ
(
st+1 − s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
− ϑt s˜t+1 − st+1
τ¯ y + st+1
)
= pt+1 (A.12)
By substituting equation (A.12) into equation (A.4) (one period ahead), we get incum-
bent’s maximization problem in period t+ 1
E(wt+1|ϑt) + pt+1 = y(1− τ¯)− st+1 − V (st+1) + λ(1 + ϑt)(τ¯ y + st+1) + pt+1 (A.13)
where pt+1 is defined by equation (A.12). Solving the FOC for st+1, we get
−1− V ′(st+1) + λ(1 + ϑt) + ϕ(1 + ϑt) τ¯ y + s˜t+1(τ¯ y + st+1)2 = 0 (A.14)
In equilibrium, politicians’ choice of seignorage must be consistent with the voters’
guesses (conjectures): st+1 = s˜t+163. This gives us
V ′(st+1) = λ(1 + ϑt)− 1 + ϕ 1 + ϑt
τ¯ y + st+1
(A.15)
Comparing equations (A.15) and (A.7), we see that incumbents choose higher levels of
distortions (hence higher levels of seignorage) during elections periods, as the last term
on the right hand side of equation (A.15) is nonnegative. This yields the central result
of the model: the government’s budget balance is influenced by the timing of elections,
and hence PBCs are expected to appear in all election periods and in all countries that
have elections.
A.1.1 Non-economic voting and competitiveness
A strong assumption of the above model is that the sensitivity of reelection probability to
the level of competence is considered to be the same in all periods. This assumption may
be satisfied when neither the government nor the voters can observe how this sensitivity
parameter varies over time, that is, when there is no access to free media (e.g. radios,
television, newspapers) or when the available media do not deliver any information about
voters’ attitudes and voting intentions. In the opposite case, the observable value of
this sensitivity parameter can reshape politicians’ incentives in election years and affect
the size of distortions identified in the above model. To see this, let us assume that the
sensitivity of reelection probability to the level of competence in period t, denoted now
by ϕt, is given by
ϕt = Ωt(1− Σt) + vt (A.16)
where vt is an i.i.d. error term with mean equal to 0, Σt is the level of non-economic
voting (i.e the relative impact that non-economic issues have on vote choice) in period
62Recall that ϑt+1 is drawn from a uniform distribution with mean 1 and density ϕ and hence ∀x
Pr(ϑt+1 ≥ x) = 1− Pr(ϑt+1 ≤ x) = 1
2
+ ϕ(1− x)
63This implies that the probability of reelection in equilibrium is 0.5 (by equation (A.12)), which is
consistent with the assumption that the incumbent does not know his own competence when setting
the level of seignorage in period t+ 1.
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t, such that 0 ≤ Σt < 1, and Ωt is the level of competitiveness (i.e. the closeness of
the incumbent and the challenger in the electoral race) in period t, such that Ωt > 0
and E(Ωt) = ϕ. Equation (A.16) suggests that the higher the weight voters assign
to non-economic issues and the lower the level of competitiveness, the less sensitive is
the probability of reelection to marginal changes in incumbent’s competence level. We
further assume that the realizations of Σt and Ωt are known to everyone (policymakers
and voters) in period t (i.e. due to full access to free media that deliver such information
via the publication of opinion polls) and that policy decisions in period t are made after
observing Σt and Ωt. Under these assumptions ϑt is now drawn from a continuous
uniform distribution with mean 1 and density ϕ¯t defined as
ϕ¯t = E(ϕt|Σt,Ωt) = Ωt(1− Σt) (A.17)
and hence the equilibrium seignorage in on-election periods is now given by
V ′(st+1) = λ(1 + ϑt)− 1 + Ωt(1− Σt) 1 + ϑt
τ¯ y + st+1
(A.18)
Notice that when we consider the special case in which the evaluation of government
performance depends only on economic issues and the level of competitiveness is equal to
its expected value (that is, when we impose the restrictions that Σt = 0 and Ωt = ϕ), the
conditional expectation in (A.17) becomes equal to ϕ and the equilibrium seignorage
in on-election years is the same as the one defined in (A.15). On the other hand,
once we relax these restrictions, we can see from the last term on the right hand side
of equation (A.18) that the seignorage distortion costs that politicians are willing to
pay in equilibrium (and hence the incentives to manipulate fiscal policy), V ′(st+1),
are a negative function of the level of non-economic voting Σt and a positive function
of the level of competitiveness Ωt. As V ′(.) > 0, this also implies that
∂st+1
∂Σt
< 0
and ∂st+1∂Ωt > 0. Intuitively, the larger the level of non-economic voting, the weaker
are politicians’ incentives to increase government expenditure in order to enhance their
chance of reelection, as fewer voters can be influenced by an electoral expenditure boom.
As a result the equilibrium level of seignorage decreases in election years. On the other
hand, a higher level of competitiveness has the opposite effect, as the electoral outcome
becomes less sensitive to marginal changes in votes, which results in a higher level of
equilibrium seignorage in election years. Notice also that if the level of non-economic
voting is close to 1 (i.e. voters do not care about economic issues when casting their
votes) or the level of competitiveness is close to 0 (i.e. the government is certain of
losing or winning the elections), the equilibrium levels of seignorage in on election and
off election periods are about the same, as the last term on the right hand side of
(A.18) is close to zero. Therefore, in contrast to the model proposed by Persson &
Tabellini (2000), the central result of this subsection is that PBCs are only identifiable
in countries/years with sufficiently large levels of competitiveness and sufficiently low
levels of non-economic voting.
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A.2 Econometric Theory: Dynamic Panel Data Estimation
Since the seminal paper by Nickell (1981), where it is shown that the Fixed Effects (FE)
estimator is not consistent for finite time length T in autoregressive panel data models,
a number of consistent instrumental variable (IV) and Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM) estimators have been proposed in the econometric literature as an alternative
to FE estimator. Anderson & Hsiao (1982) suggest two simple IV estimators that,
upon transforming the model to first differences to eliminate the unobserved individual
heterogeneity, use the second lags of the depended variable, either differenced or in
levels, as instrument for the differenced one-time lagged depended variable. Arellano
& Bond (1991) argue that the Anderson-Hsiao estimator, although consistent, fails to
take all the potential orthogonality conditions into account and does not exploit all
the information available in the sample. In order to construct more efficient estimates
of the dynamic panel data model, Arellano & Bond (1991) develop a GMM estimator
that treats the model as a system of equations, one per time period, and allows the
instruments applicable to each equation to differ (for instance, in later periods, more
lagged values of the instruments are available). The instruments include suitable lags of
the levels of endogenous variables, which enter the equation in differenced form, as well
as the strictly exogenous regressors and any other that may be specified. A potential
weakness in the Arellano-Bond estimator is revealed in later work by Arellano & Bover
(1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The lagged levels are often rather poor instruments
for first-differenced variables, especially if the variables are close to a random walk. Their
modification of the estimator includes lagged levels as well as lagged differences. The
original estimator is often entitled “difference GMM”, whereas the expanded estimator
is commonly termed “system GMM”. The cost of the system GMM estimator involves
a set of additional restrictions on the initial conditions of the process generating the
dependent variable. Both the difference and system GMM estimators have one-step
and two-step variants. The two-step estimates of the difference GMM standard errors
have been shown to have a severe downward bias. To evaluate the precision of the
two-step estimators for hypothesis tests, Windmeijer (2005) proposes a finite-sample
correction to these standard errors.
The appeal of the difference and system GMM estimators lies in the hope they offer
for solving a tough estimation problem: the combination of a short panel, a dynamic
dependent variable, fixed effects, and a lack of good external instruments. But, as Rood-
man (2008) point out, an underappreciated problem often arises in the application of
these estimators: instrument proliferation. In other words, as T rises, the instrument
count can easily grow large relative to the sample size, making some asymptotic results
about the estimators and related specification tests misleading (i.e. due to overfitting
endogenous variables and imprecise estimates of the optimal weighting matrix). There-
fore, in order to limit the number of instruments generated in the difference and system
GMM estimators, we use only certain lags instead of all available lags for instruments.
Separate instruments are still generated for each period, but the number per period is
capped, so that the instruments count is linear in T .
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A.3 Tables
Table A.3.1: Country Classification
No Country Year of entering Year of adopting Established Plurality Presidential
the EU the euro democracya ruleb regimec
1 Austria 1995 1999
√
2 Belgium 1952 1999
√
3 Bulgaria 2007
4 Cyprus 2004 2008
√ √
5 Czech Rep. 2004
√
6 Denmark 1973
√
7 Estonia 2004
8 Finland 1995 1999
√
9 France 1952 1999
√ √
10 Germany 1952 1999
√ √
11 Greece 1981 2001
√ √
12 Hungary 2004
√
13 Ireland 1973 1999
√
14 Italy 1952 1999
√ √
15 Latvia 2004
16 Lithuania 2004
√ √
17 Luxembourg 1952 1999
√
18 Malta 2004 2008
√
19 Netherlands 1952 1999
√
20 Poland 2004
√
21 Portugal 1986 1999
√
22 Romania 2007
23 Slovakia 2004 2009
24 Slovenia 2004 2007
25 Spain 1986 1999
√ √
26 Sweden 1995
√
27 UK 1973
√ √
a Refers to a country which has been democratic for more than 20 years. b Refers to a country with a plurality
rule in legislative elections (i.e. a country with either a strictly plurality or a mixed plurality-proporional
system). c Refers to a country where the executive is not accountable to to the legislature. Source: Database
of Political Institutions of the World Bank (Beck et al., 2001).
Table A.3.2: Components and Subcomponents of Expenditure and Revenue
Total Expenditure Current Expenditure (1) Final Consumption Expenditure
(2) Social Benefits other than Social Transfers in Kind
(3) Interest
(4) Subsidies
(5) Other Current Expenditure
Capital Expenditure (1) Gross Fixed Capital Formation
(2) Other Capital Expenditure
Total Revenue Current Revenue (1) Taxes
(2) Social Contributions Received
(3) Other Current Revenue
Capital Revenue (1) Capital Transfers Received
The partition of expenditure and revenue into components and subcomponents is based on the European
System of Accounts 1995 (ESA 95). Source: Statistical Annex to European Economy; European Commission.
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